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Abstract. To address the gap, that is, few studies have explored the influence of the participants’ interactions with one another 
during construction quality supervision, this paper proposes a system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory to 
describe the complex and dynamic interactions among tripartite stakeholders in China, including the project owner (PO), con-
struction supervising engineer (CSE), and construction contractor (CC). First, the replicated dynamic equation set is established 
in terms of expense targets. Second, the equilibrium solutions of the equation set are obtained to test strategy options. The trends 
of system fluctuations caused by penalty and reward changes are also analyzed. Finally, the stability of the proposed model is im-
proved by integrating a dynamic penalty–reward scenario into the evolutionary strategy of the PO. Simulation results show that: 
1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in initial interactions, 2) the degrees of penalty and reward considerably affect 
the CC’s rate variable, and 3) the dynamic penalty–reward scenario could effectively improve the stability of the proposed model. 
The unsteadiness of the quality supervision system and the stability control scenario could help in understanding the impact of 
interactions among stakeholders and provide suggestions for optimizing quality supervision procedures.
Keywords: construction quality, quality supervision, tripartite stakeholders, evolutionary game theory, system dynamics, 
dynamic penalty–reward.
Introduction
The construction industry is often criticized for its poor 
performance on quality (Kanji, Wong 1998). Quality in 
its simplest form could be defined as: “meeting the cus-
tomer’s expectations” or “compliance with the customer’s 
specification” (Jha, Iyer 2006). Compared with other in-
dustries, construction procedures entail much concealed 
work, which leads to the limited effect of final quality de-
tection (Arditi, Gunaydin 1997). To meet the owner’s ex-
pectation, quality in construction not only means physical 
quality but also represents working quality. Organization 
is one of the most critical factors affecting working quality 
(Chan et al. 2004). Its influence is mainly reflected in two 
aspects: 1) the degree of standardized construction and 
2) the strength of supervision. The first one is related to 
the construction contractor (CC). The second one involves 
other types of participants, namely, the project owner 
(PO) and the construction supervising engineer (CSE) in 
China (Wang, Huang 2006). According to China’s Regula-
tion on the Quality Management of Construction Projects, 
the PO should entrust quality management tasks to the 
CSE. The CSE represents the interests of the PO in terms 
of construction quality. Moreover, the CC is responsible 
for construction quality, whereas the PO and CSE have 
supervision responsibilities. Compared with their coun-
terparts in other countries, the PO and CC in China have 
similar responsibilities in the quality supervision process, 
whereas the CSE differs in some respects. The specific dif-
ferences are shown in Table 1.
The CSE provides consultant services in quality su-
pervision. In developed countries, supervision works are 
comprehensive, and they consider entire process services, 
high technical requirements, and good profits. Therefore, 
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Table 1. Differences of the CSE in various countries
Country Scope of work Compulsory Technical level Profitsa (%)
China Construction stage All projects Low 0.6–3
America Whole process Government projects High 6–15
German Whole process All projects High 7–14
Britain Whole process Most projects High 8.85–13.25
Japan Whole process Projects above a certain scale High 3
a The profit is based on total engineering cost.
on average, the construction quality in developed coun-
tries is better than that in China. Unlike their peers in de-
veloped countries, CSEs in China are chiefly responsible 
for supervision in the construction stage, with a focus on 
quality and safety. Their consultant service is limited, and 
they are unable to achieve maximum effectiveness. In Chi-
na, a CSE’s low technical level leads to poor efficiency, and 
low profits lead to less R&D investment and slow technical 
progress, which forms a vicious cycle between efficiency 
and technical level. In addition, even if a PO is unsatisfied 
with the performance of a CSE, it cannot dismiss the CSE 
because of the mandatory provision of the government, 
which worsened the relationship between the PO and CSE. 
Paradoxically, the PO is rarely involved in quality supervi-
sion because it considers the CSE responsible for quality. 
In summary, these factors generate the complexity regard-
ing the influence of participants in quality supervision and 
increase the uncertainty of stakeholders’ behavior. For ex-
ample, contractors receive payment from owners, so they 
are more compliant toward owners than toward engineers 
when quality problems occur (Chen, Partington 2004). 
Moreover, some contractors engage in jerry-building to 
obtain illegal and additional benefits. Instead of providing 
strict supervision, some engineers seek rent from contrac-
tors and even cheat owners with contractors (Wang et al. 
2014). Furthermore, some owners do not have sufficient 
professional skills to handle their work, so they rely heavily 
on engineers for quality supervision (Huang et al. 2008). 
All these problems reflect the negative interactions be-
tween the tripartite stakeholders of the PO, CSE, and CC 
in the quality supervision process. Existing studies merely 
analyze the impact of such interactions on quality perfor-
mance. However, quality in the construction stage could 
only be achieved through the direct efforts of all stake-
holders. Therefore, the identification of critical factors that 
affect conflicts and collaborations among stakeholders and 
provide solutions to optimize the procedures of quality su-
pervision are of theoretical and practical significance. 
Game theory involves studying the mathematical 
models of conflict and cooperation on multi-person in-
teractions, which could help explore behavioral relations 
among stakeholders in the quality supervision process. 
Existing literature on game theory applications in con-
struction has mainly entail dispute resolution (San Cris-
tóbal 2015; Khanzadi et  al. 2016), risk management (Li 
et al. 2016; Nasirzadeh et al. 2016), and resource manage-
ment (Sacks, Harel 2006); in addition, most of them ap-
plied classical game theory to solve problems. However, 
game theory involves an important hypothesis on the play-
ers, that is, the players are intelligent and rational, which 
is inconsistent with the actual situation. Compared with 
classical game theory, evolutionary game theory combines 
game theory with dynamic evolution process analysis, 
and it focuses more on the dynamics of strategy change 
(Weibull 1997). Evolutionary game theory aims at finding 
stable strategies in any area with conflict of interests (Par-
sapour-Moghaddam et  al. 2015). Tripartite stakeholders 
involved in quality supervision are bounded and rational, 
and they change and adjust their strategies dynamically by 
observing and comparing payoffs with others. Therefore, 
evolutionary game theory is more suitable for studying the 
long-term dynamic game among tripartite stakeholders 
in quality supervision in China. To analyze the feedback 
structure of the game, some studies used system dynamics 
(SD) to analyze the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) and 
achieved good results (e.g. Tian et al. 2014; Liu et al. 2015; 
Duan et al. 2016). Hence, SD can provide a solution to bal-
ance the interests of tripartite stakeholders and improve 
quality supervision work. 
To bridge the gap in extant research, this paper propos-
es an SD model based on evolutionary game theory to ana-
lyze the evolutionary game for quality supervision among 
tripartite stakeholders, which includes the PO, CSE, and 
CC. First, the relationships among tripartite stakeholders 
were described and assumed according to organizational 
problems. Second, a replicated dynamic equation set was 
established based on behavior strategies in terms of ex-
pense targets, which reflects the strategy adjustments of 
the PO, CC, and CSE. Third, equilibrium solutions were 
ascertained. Fourth, the stability of the equilibrium solu-
tions and the influence of external variables were analyzed 
through simulations of the SD model. Finally, the ESS was 
identified under the dynamic penalty–incentive scenario. 
A framework of the proposed model is presented in Fig-
ure 1.
In summary, the proposed model was applied to iden-
tify the behavior rules of the PO, CC, and CSE in the qual-
ity supervision process and ascertain their influence on 
one another through simulations. This research aims to 
prove the irrational problems among tripartite stakehold-
ers in the Chinese quality supervision organization and 
explore practical solutions to optimize the quality supervi-
sion mode based on the outcomes of the suggested model.
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Figure 1. Framework of the proposed model
1. Literature review
1.1. Quality management in the construction industry
Quality management comprises all the activities that man-
agers perform to implement their quality policy (Harris, 
McCaffer 2013). In the construction industry, numerous 
efforts have been made regarding quality management, 
including those in quality assurance (QA), quality control 
(QC), and total quality management (TQM). Although 
often used interchangeably, the terms QA and QC are 
distinct as QA emphasizes defect prevention, whereas QC 
focuses on defect detection. The principles of QA, such 
as ISO 9001, have been virtually regarded as essential in 
today’s construction industry (Harris, McCaffer 2013). 
Moreover, some traditional methods have been fur-
ther developed for QC, such as Six Sigma (Tchidi et  al. 
2012). Technical improvements have also been made to 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of QA and QC 
during construction, including information systems (Love, 
Irani 2003; Cheng et  al. 2015), BIM (Chen, Luo 2014), 
thermography (Taylor et  al. 2013), laser scanning (Bos-
ché 2010), and RFID (Lu et al. 2011). TQM is based on 
the philosophy of continuously improving goods or ser-
vices, including in construction (Pheng, Teo 2004). Some 
studies have confirmed the gradual adoption and utiliza-
tion of TQM by construction companies to solve quality 
problems (Arditi, Gunaydin 1997; Wong 1999; Pheng, Teo 
2004). Despite the positive developments, barriers must 
still be overcome to achieve better quality. Some of those 
impediments are within the organizations involved in con-
struction. Loushine et  al. (2006) revealed that “shoddy” 
implementation as an obstacle to the success of quality 
management in construction projects. Talib et al. (2011) 
found that employee resistance to change hindered TQM 
implementation. Abdul-Aziz (2002) indicated the non-di-
rect link between the main contractors and site operatives 
as a constraining factor affecting construction quality. 
Some barriers are reflected in conflicts among construc-
tion participants (Jha, Iyer 2006; Hoonakker et al. 2010; 
Toor, Ogunlana 2010). Several studies have provided so-
lutions to overcome these hindrances. For example, Love 
et  al. (2000) proposed a framework of learning organi-
zation to continually improve TQM. Meng (2012) con-
firmed that the adoption of supply chain collaboration 
and partnering helped solve the quality performance 
problem. Eriksson and Westerberg (2011) suggested that 
cooperative procurement procedures positively influence 
project quality. Furthermore, Dikmen et al. (2005) argued 
that quality function deployment could remove function 
barriers among departments. In addition, some studies 
have examined the impact of specific stakeholders (e.g. 
contractor and vendor) on quality management and pro-
vided suggestions for further amelioration (Doloi et  al. 
2011; Sullivan 2011; Alzahrani, Emsley 2013). Thus, an 
organization acts as a critical factor affecting quality per-
formance. Solutions and recommendations from the liter-
ature have primarily focused on the change management 
patterns and procedures of certain stakeholders. However, 
quality problems are sometimes caused by inadequate or 
unethical behaviors of stakeholders in construction activi-
ties, and few studies have analyzed the impact of negative 
interactions among stakeholders on quality.
Quality supervision, which primarily influences the 
overall performance and efficiency of construction pro-
jects, is a specific procedure of QC (O’Brien 2013). The 
PO, CSE, and CC are tripartite stakeholders involved in 
quality supervision. The impact of their behaviors in their 
interaction with one other needs to be clarified, and thus, 
appropriate suggestions could be made to build trust and 
reduce conflict in the supervision activities.
1.2. Applications of system dynamics based on 
evolutionary game theory 
Evolutionary game theory is one of the most fruitful 
frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines 
(Roca et al. 2009). It was developed to overcome the disadvan-
tages of traditional game theory when analyzing the bound-
ed rationality of players and the dynamic process of game 
playing. SD was adopted to study the stability of the equi-
librium solution by analyzing the feedback behaviors among 
stakeholders in the game. Several studies have combined 
SD with evolutionary game theory to evaluate and resolve 
problems in various areas, including supply chain, commercial 
domains, environmental pollution, and safety. For example, 
Tian et al. (2014) analyzed the relationships of stakeholders 
as government, enterprises, and consumers through evolu-
tionary game theory and developed an SD model to promote 
the diffusion of green supply chain management in China. 
Similarly, Zhang (2016) constructed a dynamic evolutionary 
game model to study equilibrium stability in the game between 
commercial banks and closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) 
enterprises. Besides, Wang et al. (2011) proposed an SD model for 
examining a mixed-strategy evolutionary game of en-
vironmental pollution between the government and a 
firm. Liu et  al. (2015) explored dynamic simulations of 
the evolutionary game model to assess the stability of 
stakeholder interactions in a coal mine safety inspection sys-
tem. 
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The aforementioned applications reveal that the com-
bination of evolutionary game theory with the SD method 
is suitable for simulating dynamic games, and thus has 
potential for describing the interactions among tripartite 
stakeholders and further identify equilibrium solutions in 
quality supervision.
2. Evolutionary game analysis of construction 
quality supervision
In the construction quality supervision in China, tripar-
tite stakeholders behave as bounded rational players, and 
their information is asymmetric. Specifically, the stake-
holders cannot always make the right decisions under 
limited information. Moreover, the CSE spends most of 
the time working in the construction site to obtain more 
information about the CC than the PO. In repetitious 
games, stakeholders change their strategies dynamically 
by observing and comparing payoff with others and then 
adjusting their strategies. Therefore, evolutionary game 
theory was adopted to study the long-term dynamic game 
among the said stakeholders.
2.1. Game relationship description and assumption
Given the actual situation of construction in China, the 
game relationship of the tripartite stakeholders in quality 
supervision is described as follows:
 – The PO supervises the CSE and CC. Its strategy 
choices can be supervised or unsupervised as regards 
ensuring construction quality and supervision cost. 
 – The CSE regulates the CC. Its strategy choices can be 
executed as regulation duties or not in view of pun-
ishment from the PO and additional benefits (rent-
seeking) from the CC.
 – The CC is under the supervision of the PO and CSE 
in relation to quality. Its strategy choices can be 
strictly implemented as standardized construction 
or non-standardized construction (e.g. jerry-building 
and using substandard materials). 
Bribery behavior is assumed to exist between the CSE 
and CC, but not between the PO and CC. Therefore, the 
behavior information between the CSE and CC is incom-
plete. The other assumption is that the PO and CSE’s abil-
ity of supervision is sufficiently powerful, and they could 
find all the situations of non-standardized construction by 
the CC.
2.2. Game equation definition and analysis
To represent the supervision strategy by the PO in the evo-
lutionary game model, x (0 ≤ x ≤ 1) is designated as the 
supervision ratio. When x = 0 or 1, then no supervision or 
real-time supervision is made on the CC and CSE. How-
ever, decisions about the supervision strategy have cost 
implications. Real-time supervision cost is high, so limited 
times of supervision are practical. Therefore, the PO must 
pay a cost when supervising the CC’s construction situa-
tions and the CSE’s execution of regulation duties. During 
supervision, Ca (Ca > 0) represents the PO’s supervision 
cost, La (La > 0) indicates the PO’s expected loss caused 
by malpractice, and Pb (Pb > 0) and Rb (Rb < Pb) denote 
the CC’s penalties and rewards from the PO, respectively. 
Moreover, the CSE will be punished because of dereliction 
of regulation duties or be given rewards when regulating 
the CC strictly, that is, Pc (Pc > 0) and Rc (Rc < Pc) signify 
the CSE’s penalties and rewards, respectively.
The CC chooses y (0 ≤ y ≤ 1) as its strategy during 
construction, in which y represents the standardized con-
struction ratio. The degree of standardized construction by 
the CC is increased from 0 to 1. In the CC’s construction 
activities, Nb (Nb > 0) indicates the profits from standard-
ized construction, whereas Cb (Cb > 0) denotes the qual-
ity cost. If the CC chooses non-standardized construction, 
some quality cost will be saved and the probability of pro-
ject quality defects or accidents will be increased, which 
will result in expected loss. Such expected loss includes 
not only the cost of rework or requirement, but also rent-
seeking to the CSE, in which Sb (Sb < Cb) and Fb (Fb < Sb) 
signify total expected losses under successful and unsuc-
cessful rent-seeking, respectively.
The CSE chooses z (0 ≤ z ≤ 1) as their strategy when 
regulating the CC’s construction situation, in which z 
represents regulation ratio. When z = 0, dereliction of reg-
ulation duties and even power rent-seeking transpired, and 
z = 1 denotes the strict execution of regulation duties. Dur-
ing regulation, Nc (Nc > 0) represents the profits for quality 
regulation work of the CSE. If the CSE chooses the der-
eliction of regulation duties and even power rent-seeking, 
then it will gain rent from the CC, but it will simultane-
ously incur an expected loss when the PO investigates and 
assigns responsibility, and Ec (Lc < Ec < Sb) and Lc (Lc > 0) 
symbolize net rents and expected loss, respectively. 
The payoff matrix among tripartite stakeholders is 
shown in Figure 2 according to the pre-defined variables 
above.
2.3. Game equation solution and application
According to evolutionary game theory, bounded rational 
players tend to choose those strategies whose fitness or 
payoff is better than the other strategies on replicator dy-
namics. By constantly imitating and learning, players will 
achieve a balance between anti-interference and stability. 
Consequently, the PO’s supervision fitness and no-super-
vision fitness can be obtained as follows:
( ) (1 ) ( )
(1 )( )
(1 )(1 )( )
= ( ) z(P );
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where Ux is supervision fitness, and U1–x is no-supervision 
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Figure 2. Payoff matrix of the PO, CC and CSE
fitness. Thus, the average fitness of the PO can be obtained 
as follows:
,1 1(1 )x x x xU xU x U− −= + − .  (3)
In the evolutionary game, the PO tends to learn and 
imitate strategies of higher fitness. The higher the strate-
gy’s fitness is, the higher the probability of it being chosen. 








= − = − + − =
− −
x xx x x x
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dx x U U x U xU x U
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x x U U  (4)
By defining ( , , ) /=F x y z dx dt and bringing Eqns (1) and 
(2) into Eqn (4), we obtain Eqn (5) or the PO’s replicated 
dynamic equation as follows:
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Similarly, the change rates of y and z are respectively, are 
as follows:
( , , ) (1 )
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;
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Therefore, the dynamic interaction of tripartite stake-
holders could be represented by a replicated dynamic 
equation set composed of Eqns  (5), (6), and (7), which 
reflects the speed and direction of the strategy adjustment 
of the PO, CC, and CSE. When the equation set is equal to 
zero, it means that the strategy will not be changed and the 
evolutionary game system reaches a relatively stable equi-
librium state. Furthermore, the stability of the equilibri-
um solution could be analyzed by calculating the Jacobian 
matrix’s determinant and trace of the game, which reflects 
the existence of the ESS. The Jacobian matrix is as follows:
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )
F x y z F x y z F x y z
x x x
G x y z G x y z G x y zJ
x x x
H x y z H x y z H x y z
x x x
∂ ∂ ∂ 
 ∂ ∂ ∂ 
∂ ∂ ∂ =  ∂ ∂ ∂
 
∂ ∂ ∂  ∂ ∂ ∂ 
.  (8)
According to Friedman’s theory (Friedman 1991), 
when the Jacobian matrix’s determinant ( ) 0Det J > and 
its trace ( ) 0Tr J < , the equilibrium solution is the ESS. 
Given the amount and tediousness of calculations, a com-
puter simulation method could be considered to provide 
decision support for a complicatedly dynamic multi-play-
er game.
3. Analysis of a system dynamics model of 
construction quality supervision
System dynamics is an effective simulation method to 
understand the behavior of complex systems over time, 
mainly by analyzing the causality and interaction among 
different variables within the system (Vlachos et al. 2007). 
Considering its advantages in solving problems with in-
complete information, the evolutionary game process un-
der bounded rationality could be well simulated with SD. 
Then, the existence or absence of ESS could be identified. 
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Moreover, the tripartite stakeholders’ behavior changes 
could be presumed by changing external variables.
3.1. Description and development of the system 
dynamics model
By using Vensim PLE Version 6.3, the evolutionary game 
SD model was established according to the above game 
equation assumption and analysis, as shown in Figure 3.
The SD model has 3 level variables, 3 rate variables, 12 
auxiliary variables, and 13 external variables. Level vari-
ables involve the accumulations (i.e., ratio of PO choosing 
supervision) within the system. Rate variables represent 
the flows in the system (i.e., changing rate of choosing su-
pervision) caused by the decision-making process. Aux-
iliary variables refer to transition variables by calculation 
(i.e., supervision fitness), whereas external variables entail 
the constants in the system (i.e., PO supervision cost). The 
functional relationship among these variables relies on the 
above replicated dynamic equation set of the game system.
3.2. Simulation and analysis of system dynamics 
model 
The model settings are: INITIAL TIME = 0, FINAL 
TIME = 100, TIME STEP = 0.03125, Units for Time: 
Month, Integration Type: Euler. According to the China 
Construction Industry Statistical Yearbook, the initial val-
ues of external variables in the SD model are shown in 
Table 2.
Therefore, the equilibrium solutions of the replicated 
dynamic equation set (8) are obtained as follows, name-
ly, eight and two equilibrium solutions of pure and mixed 
strategies, respectively:
Figure 3. Evolutionary game SD model of construction quality supervision
Table 2. Initial values of external variables in the SD model
Variables Meaning of the variables Initial values
Ca PO supervision cost 1
La PO expected loss because of malpractice 4
Nb CC profits 10
Cb CC quality cost 4
Pb CC penalties 4
Rb CC rewards 2
Sb CC total cost under successful rent-seeking 2
Fb CC total cost under unsuccessful rent-seeking 1
Nc CSE profits 5
Ec CSE net rent 1.5
Lc CSE expected loss because of dereliction 0.5
Pc CSE penalties 2
Rc CSE rewards 1
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1 2 3 4 5
0 0 0 0 1
= 0 , = 1 , = 0 , = 1 , = 0
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         
         
λ λ λ λ λ         
         
         
;
6 7 8 9 10
1 1 1 1/ 3 1/ 2
= 1 , = 0 , = 1 , = 10 /11 , = 7 /11
0 1 1 0 1
         
         
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         
         
.
3.3. Stability analysis of equilibrium solutions
For example, λ9 is incorporated into the SD model for 
simulation, and the game result is shown in Figure 4. Note 
that tripartite stakeholders do not actively change their 
initial strategies and no one adopts a new strategy, which 
reflects a relatively balanced state.
However, this relatively balanced state is unsteady. If 
the CSE in λ9 mutates their initial strategy, that is, the ratio 
of z in λ9 changes from 0 to 0.01, then the game could be 
simulated again (results are shown in Figure 5). The simu-
lation result shows unsteadiness because the strategy se-
lection of the CSE evolves gradually toward z = 1, whereas 
the strategy selections of the other two fluctuate repeat-
edly. Similarly, the balanced states of the mixed strategy 
λ10 and other pure strategies are also unsteady according 
to the simulation results. In conclusion, no ESS is present 
in the game played.
3.4. Influence of external variables on the system 
dynamics model
The existing fluctuations make it difficult to control con-
struction quality. Therefore, the fluctuations should be 
controlled in the game playing or force game process to 
reach a certain state of stability. In the model, external 
variables act as critical factors affecting the fluctuations. 
Among these external variables, penalty and reward are 
relatively easier to adjust in actual situations; thus, their 
influences are examined. To compare the degree of their 
influences, a hypothesis that x, y, and z are equal to 0.5 is 
proposed under initial conditions. The simulation results 
are shown in Figure 6.
First, the influence of penalty is discussed. After in-
creasing penalties of the CC and CSE, that is, Pb changes 
from 4 to 6 and Pc changes from 2 to 3, the game results are 
shown in Figures 7 and 8. Comparison with Figure 6 re-
veals that increasing the penalty of the CC cannot decrease 
the equilibrium point of the game process, but in the long 
term, it allows the game system to reach a stable state of 
x = 0, y = 1, and z = 1 in advance. By contrast, increasing 
the penalty of the CSE has no influence on the fluctuations 
Figure 4. Game result under initial strategy λ9
Figure 5. Game results exist mutation (λ9)
Figure 6. Game results under the initial hypothesis
Figure 7. Game results under penalty increase for CC (Pb)
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of the CC, although the CSE chooses strict execution of 
regulation duties. 
The influence of reward is then investigated. After 
changing rewards of the CC and CSE, that is, Rb changes 
from 2 to 0 and Rc changes from 1 to 1.5, the game results 
are shown in Figures  9 and 10. In China, ensuring con-
struction quality is the CC’s duty, so the CC’s good perfor-
mance usually entails no reward. However, the increasing 
reward of the CC could clearly reduce the fluctuating time 
of the game process, as demonstrated by the comparison of 
Figures 6 and 9. Figures 8 and 10 indicate that the increase 
in the CSE’s penalty or reward does not influence the game 
process of the CC, which also proves the effect of the PO’s 
supervision and the aborted regulation of the CSE.
To further verify the aborted regulation of the CSE, an-
other simulation is made, specifically on how y changes 
when changes are made to z. A hypothesis is that x = 0.5 
and z = 0, 0.1, 0.5 or 0.9. The game result is shown in Fig-
ure 11. From Figure 11, the fluctuating time increases as z 
increases, which proves the negative effect on the quality su-
pervision system when the CSE executes regulation duties.
In summary, increasing penalty from the PO to the CC 
contributes to strengthening the deterrent of the PO, and 
increasing reward properly is conducive to giving full play 
to the enthusiasm and creativity of the CC, both of which 
could reduce the non-standardized construction ratio of 
the CC. However, the CSE chooses execution of regulation 
duties either by increasing penalty or reward, but neither 
variable has an influence on the CC. The reason for such 
finding is that the CSE has the right of supervision but no 
right to implement rewards or penalties on the CC in Chi-
na, which renders the CC’s strategy selection ineffective 
and may mislead the PO’s supervision strategy.
3.5. Stability control scenarios of the construction 
supervision system
Repeated fluctuation of the SD model could be reduced 
by increasing the penalty and reward from the PO to the 
CC. However, the effect is not evident through reducing 
fluctuating time or forcing the game process to reach a 
certain state of stability. Therefore, studying the effective 
stability control scenarios on the fluctuations is necessary.
Many studies have proven that correlating penalties 
with their unlawful behavior ratio could effectively re-
strain the fluctuations (Cai 2011; Wang et al. 2011). In ad-
dition, evolutionary game theory could be used to identify 
the most appropriate penalty functions to inhibit unlawful 
behaviors (Estalaki et al. 2015). Some investigations have 
confirmed that increasing reward reduces the unlawful 
Figure 8. Game results under penalty increase of CSE (Pc)
Figure 9. Game results under reward change for CC (Rb)
Figure 10. Game results under reward increase for CSE (Rc)
Figure 11. Game results when z changes
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behavior ratio (Cheng 2011; Li et al. 2017). Considering 
the verified negative impact of the CSE in the supervision 
process, an optimized dynamic penalty–incentive control 
scenario is proposed between the PO and CC, that is, the 
PO makes penalties and rewards dynamically according to 
the CC’s standardized construction ratio, as shown in the 
following formula:




P m P y m
x
;   (9)
1 2' *b b
b
xR n R y n
C
= ∗ + ,   (10)
where m1, m2, n1, and n2 represent the corresponding 
penalty coefficients or reward coefficients, which are all 
set to 1 in this study. Thus, the game SD model (Figure 3) 
is changed into the following figure (Figure 12) under the 
dynamic penalty–reward control scenario.
Results of the simulated evolutionary game process 
under the dynamic penalty–reward control scenario are 
shown below. When randomly considering the initial 
strategies A = (x = 0.5, y = 0.5, z = 0.5) and B = (x = 0.6, y = 
0.2, z = 0.4), the simulation results are shown in Figures 13 
and 14, respectively.
Simulation results show that the game approximately 
converges to λ = (0, 1, 1), which presents an ideal ESS in 
which the CC will nearly choose standardized construc-
tion as their optimal strategy when the PO merely super-
vises at a small ratio. In addition, similar game results were 
obtained by randomly changing the strategies except for x, 
y, or z = 0. Given the inclusion of Cb/x in the formula, the 
ESS is λ* = (x, 1, 1) as a result of x ≠ 0, in which: 




λ = = .  (11)
Figure 12. Evolutionary game SD model under the dynamic penalty–reward control scenario
Figure 13. Game results under dynamic penalty–reward control 
scenario (Strategy A)
Figure 14. Game results under dynamic penalty–reward control 
scenario (Strategy B)
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However, whether the ESS is the true equilibrium so-
lution remains unproven. Subsequently, a mathematical 
solution is applied to verify the above simulation results. 
The initial values are plugged into simultaneous equations 
consisting of Eqns (5), (6), (7), and (8). The corresponding 
Jacobian matrix is as follows:
 
(1 2 )( 3 11 3 10) (1 )( 3 11) (1 )( 3 3)
6 (1 ) (1 2 )(6 2) (1 )
3 (1 ) 1.5 (1 ) (1 2 )(3 1.5 1)
x yz y z x x z x x y
J y y y x z y y
z z z z z x y
 − − − − + − − − − − −
 
= − − − − − − 
 − − − + − 
.    (12)
When λ*= (x, 1, 1):
7(1 2 ) 14 (1 ) 6 (1 )
0 (6 3) 0
0 0 (3 0.5)
x x x x x
J x
x
 − − − − − −
 
= − − 











lim (7 2 ) 7, lim (6 3) 3,
lim (3 0.5) 0.5.
t t
t




= − − = − = − − =
= − + = −
.
Thus, the Jacobian matrix’s determinant and trace are 
as follows:
11 22 33( ) ( 7) * 3 * ( 0.5) 10.5 0Det J a a a= = − − = > ;
11 22 33( ) ( 7) 3 ( 0.5) 4.5 0Tr J a a a= + + = − + + − = − < .
Consequently, the λ = (x, 1, 1) is the ESS, which is con-
sistent with the simulated results.
In summary, the fluctuations and low efficiency of 
the construction supervision game system are improved 
under the dynamic penalty–reward control scenario, in 
which the CC will nearly choose standardized construc-
tion as their optimal strategy when the PO merely super-
vises at a small ratio.
4. Discussions
This paper proposes an SD model based on evolutionary 
game theory to study organizational problems in qual-
ity supervision, thereby bridging the gap caused by the 
scarcity of studies about the influence of participants’ in-
teraction on quality. The strategy selections of tripartite 
stakeholders were described with specific data in terms of 
expense targets, which facilitates the quantitative analysis 
of the stakeholders’ interactions.
From the simulation process above, three results can 
be drawn:
1) The ESS does not exist in the initial interactions 
among the stakeholders, which reflects the organi-
zational problems of quality supervision in China. 
Some studies have suggested that construction qual-
ity is hindered by a complex web of relationships 
among project participants (e.g. Chen, Luo 2014). 
Wang and Huang (2006) further indicated “relation/
guanxi” as the most important criterion of project 
success in China. These findings explain some causes 
of such problems but they are qualitative descrip-
tions. By considering the balance between quality 
cost and economic benefits, this paper uses quanti-
tative analysis to describe the strategy selections of 
tripartite stakeholders in terms of expense targets. 
Results confirm the negative interactions within the 
organization, causing an unsteady quality supervi-
sion system in China.
2) Changes in one external variable of the PO (the de-
gree of penalty and reward) considerably affects the 
CC’s rate variable. Incentives positively impact the 
stakeholders’ strategy selections toward quality, as 
verified in prior research (Tang et  al. 2008; Meng, 
Gallagher 2012). However, the extent of influence 
to different project participants is poorly explored. 
Results show that the penalty and reward from the 
PO to the CC has a positive impact on the CC’s 
standardized construction. By contrast, penalty and 
reward from the PO to the CSE do not influence the 
CC’s standardized construction. In the compulsory 
supervision policy of China, when the CSE colludes 
with the CC, the CSE’s penalty is counterbalanced 
by quality cost and the CSE’s reward comes at the 
expense of sacrificing quality. For the asymmetric 
situation, although the CSE executes regulation du-
ties, it is difficult for the PO to ascertain business 
bribery between the CSE and CC, which hinders the 
CC from fulfilling its quality duty. Given the positive 
and negative findings, this study emphasizes the im-
portant role of the PO and challenges the rationality 
of the CSE’s position in quality supervision of China. 
3) The dynamic penalty–reward scenario could effec-
tively restrain the fluctuations and improve the sta-
bility of the proposed model. The scenario presents 
an optimized method for enhancing positive inter-
actions among tripartite stakeholders. Compared 
with the change of penalty and reward from external 
conditions, this control scenario could better balance 
the interests of tripartite stakeholders by intensifying 
the internal regulation of the organization. Further-
more, the dynamic penalty–reward scenario provides 
an ideal ESS in which the CC could nearly choose 
standardized construction as their optimal strategy. 
Simulation results with initial conditions show 
that the tripartite stakeholders’ behaviors are unstable, 
which indicates the existence of problems in the current 
super vision mode of China. Subsequently changing the 
degree of penalty and reward from the PO to the CC has 
a great effect, whereas such change from the CSE to the 
CC does not. The latter finding suggests that the CSE’s 
position is irrational under the Chinese compulsory 
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supervision policy. Finally, the fluctuations could be well 
controlled under the dynamic penalty–reward scenario, 
which increases the stability in the interactions among the 
stakeholders and proves the necessity for changing the su-
pervision mode. Based on these results, some suggestions 
could be made to optimize the procedures of quality super-
vision. First, compulsory supervision could be reconsid-
ered by the Chinese government for its negative impacts. 
In China’s quality supervision system, the existing quality 
supervision organizational structure needs to be reformed. 
Market-oriented supervision services could arise to break 
the interest link between the CSE and CC. The CSE could 
be transformed into a consulting service provider for the 
entire process, similar to their counterparts in some devel-
oped countries listed above. Then, the CC accomplishes 
project contracts under the direct supervision of the PO. 
The modified organizational structure will simplify rela-
tions among the tripartite stakeholders and restrain the 
rent-seeking behaviors of the CSE. Second, the PO could 
try to implement a dynamic penalty–reward scenario. This 
control scenario can help increase the degree of stand-
ardized construction by the CC. Thus, the efficiency and 
effect of quality supervision will be improved. Third, the 
PO can build a management system for special funds of 
quality supervision. If the CC performs poorly, they will 
incur penalties, which, in turn, will be included in the 
special funds. Conversely, the CC will get rewards from 
the funds. By establishing the special funds, the PO could 
better participate in construction quality management. By 
being dominated by the PO, the supervision mode will be 
accepted easily and the dynamic penalty–reward scenario 
will continue to work. In summary, an optimized program 
wherein the PO leads supervision, the CC is responsible 
for construction, and the CSE provides consulting services 
will be more suitable for a quality supervision organization 
in China, which helps reduce conflicts among the tripar-
tite stakeholders and achieve common interests.
Conclusions
The performance of a quality supervision system is di-
rectly related to whether the quality goal of the project 
could be achieved. Existing studies have focused on the 
impact of the work quality of certain participants on 
construction performance but ignore the interactions 
among stakeholders. By establishing an SD model based 
on evolutionary game theory, such interactions have been 
described and analyzed in the quality supervision system 
in China. Results show that the ESS does not exist in the 
initial interactions among tripartite stakeholders. Accord-
ingly, an effective stability control scenario was proposed 
on the analysis of the influence of external variables. From 
theoretical aspects, evolutionary game theory was used to 
simulate the dynamic interactions among tripartite stake-
holders, which could overcome the limitation of the tra-
ditional static game pertaining to its limitation in analyz-
ing complex dynamic problems. Moreover, the strategy 
changes of the tripartite stakeholders were quantitatively 
analyzed to understand the impacts of interactions. Fur-
thermore, the proposed dynamic penalty–reward scenario 
was found to balance the interests of the tripartite stake-
holders, thereby meeting the requirement of quality cost. 
From the practical aspects, the results reflect the extant 
organizational problems in the Chinese quality supervi-
sion system. The following suggestions are provided for 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of quality su-
pervision. First, the compulsory supervision policy can be 
repealed and the role of the CSE could be transformed 
into a project consulting service provider. The CSE could 
better fulfill consultation obligations as an independent 
third party. In addition, the function of the PO needs to 
be reinforced by implementing a dynamic penalty–reward 
scenario and establishing special funds. The PO’s authority 
can help regulate the construction behaviors of the CC. Fi-
nally, an optimized quality supervision organization could 
be established wherein the PO leads the supervision, the 
CC is responsible for construction, and the CSE provides 
consulting services. At present, the Chinese government 
has put forward a series of policies and measures to im-
prove compulsory supervision and promote engineering 
consulting development, which proves the feasibility of 
the above suggestions to a certain extent. Nevertheless, 
some limitations still exist that need to be addressed. 
For instance, the initial values of the external variables 
obtained from the Chinese Construction Industry Statisti-
cal Yearbook could be of hysteretic nature. If these initial 
values can instead be ascertained by collecting data from 
on-site quality documents, then the simulation results will 
be more accurate and practical. Furthermore, an assump-
tion was made whereby the PO’s ability of supervision is 
sufficiently powerful. However, the ability of supervisors 
is bounded and errors are inevitable. If the supervision 
error rate could be obtained and analyzed in the proposed 
SD model, then the simulation process will be more ra-
tional. Future research can also incorporate to the model 
the roles which represent the regulation departments of 
the government to further explore the interactions within 
and across the construction organization.
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